Is LinkedIn Lying About Having Fixed Their Security Hole?

LinkedIn just confirmed that some of their passwords were stolen.

They say in their blog post:

We want to provide you with an update on this morning’s reports of stolen passwords. We can confirm that some of the passwords that were compromised correspond to LinkedIn accounts. We are continuing to investigate this situation and here is what we are pursuing as far as next steps for the compromised accounts:

1. Members that have accounts associated with the compromised passwords will notice that their LinkedIn account password is no longer valid.

2. These members will also receive an email from LinkedIn with instructions on how to reset their passwords. There will not be any links in these emails. For security reasons, you should never change your password on any website by following a link in an email.

3. These affected members will receive a second email from our Customer Support team providing a bit more context on this situation and why they are being asked to change their passwords.

It is worth noting that the affected members who update their passwords and members whose passwords have not been compromised benefit from the enhanced security we just recently put in place, which includes hashing and salting of our current password databases. We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience this has caused our members. We take the security of our members very seriously, if you haven’t read it already it is worth checking out my earlier blog post today about updating your password other account security best practices.

Now, two things here seem fishy to me:

1. They say in #1 that members with compromised passwords have had their passwords disabled. I just discovered that my password WAS one of the leaked ones (I have a copy of the 265MB (unzipped) dump file), and I double checked with LeakedIn.org), but I can assure you that my password has NOT been disabled.

2. They say "members whose passwords have not been compromised benefit from the enhanced security we just recently put in place, which includes hashing and salting of our current password databases". But since they store the hashed passwords and not the actual passwords, how did they salt the un-compromised passwords? (I believe salting needs to be done before hashing...) Edit: As theaolway suggested below, they could do a sha1(salt+sha1(password)).