Skip to main content

How a university got itself banned from the Linux kernel

The University of Minnesota’s path to banishment was long, turbulent, and full of emotion

Illustration by William Joel

Share this story

On the evening of April 6th, a student emailed a patch to a list of developers. Fifteen days later, the University of Minnesota was banned from contributing to the Linux kernel.

“I suggest you find a different community to do experiments on,” wrote Linux Foundation fellow Greg Kroah-Hartman in a livid email. “You are not welcome here.” 

How did one email lead to a university-wide ban? I’ve spent the past week digging into this world — the players, the jargon, the university’s turbulent history with open-source software, the devoted and principled Linux kernel community. None of the University of Minnesota researchers would talk to me for this story. But among the other major characters — the Linux developers — there was no such hesitancy. This was a community eager to speak; it was a community betrayed. 

The story begins in 2017, when a systems-security researcher named Kangjie Lu became an assistant professor at the University of Minnesota. 

Lu’s research, per his website, concerns “the intersection of security, operating systems, program analysis, and compilers.” But Lu had his eye on Linux — most of his papers involve the Linux kernel in some way. 

The Linux kernel is, at a basic level, the core of any Linux operating system. It’s the liaison between the OS and the device on which it’s running. A Linux user doesn’t interact with the kernel, but it’s essential to getting things done — it manages memory usage, writes things to the hard drive, and decides what tasks can use the CPU when. The kernel is open-source, meaning its millions of lines of code are publicly available for anyone to view and contribute to. 

Getting a patch on people’s computers is no easy task

Well, “anyone.” Getting a patch onto people’s computers is no easy task. A submission needs to pass through a large web of developers and “maintainers” (thousands of volunteers, who are each responsible for the upkeep of different parts of the kernel) before it ultimately ends up in the mainline repository. Once there, it goes through a long testing period before eventually being incorporated into the “stable release,” which will go out to mainstream operating systems. It’s a rigorous system designed to weed out both malicious and incompetent actors. But — as is always the case with crowdsourced operations — there’s room for human error. 

Some of Lu’s recent work has revolved around studying that potential for human error and reducing its influence. He’s proposed systems to automatically detect various types of bugs in open source, using the Linux kernel as a test case. These experiments tend to involve reporting bugs, submitting patches to Linux kernel maintainers, and reporting their acceptance rates. In a 2019 paper, for example, Lu and two of his PhD students, Aditya Pakki and Qiushi Wu, presented a system (“Crix”) for detecting a certain class of bugs in OS kernels. The trio found 278 of these bugs with Crix and submitted patches for all of them — the fact that maintainers accepted 151 meant the tool was promising. 

On the whole, it was a useful body of work. Then, late last year, Lu took aim not at the kernel itself, but at its community. 

In “On the Feasibility of Stealthily Introducing Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Software via Hypocrite Commits,” Lu and Wu explained that they’d been able to introduce vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel by submitting patches that appeared to fix real bugs but also introduced serious problems. The group called these submissions “hypocrite commits.” (Wu didn’t respond to a request for comment for this story; Lu referred me to Mats Heimdahl, the head of the university’s department of computer science and engineering, who referred me to the department’s website.)

The explicit goal of this experiment, as the researchers have since emphasized, was to improve the security of the Linux kernel by demonstrating to developers how a malicious actor might slip through their net. One could argue that their process was similar, in principle, to that of white-hat hacking: play around with software, find bugs, let the developers know.

But the loudest reaction the paper received, on Twitter and across the Linux community, wasn’t gratitude — it was outcry.

“That paper, it’s just a lot of crap,” says Greg Scott, an IT professional who has worked with open-source software for over 20 years. 

“In my personal view, it was completely unethical,” says security researcher Kenneth White, who is co-director of the Open Crypto Audit Project. 

The frustration had little to do with the hypocrite commits themselves. In their paper, Lu and Wu claimed that none of their bugs had actually made it to the Linux kernel — in all of their test cases, they’d eventually pulled their bad patches and provided real ones. Kroah-Hartman, of the Linux Foundation, contests this — he told The Verge that one patch from the study did make it into repositories, though he notes it didn’t end up causing any harm. 

“In my personal view, it was completely unethical.”

Still, the paper hit a number of nerves among a very passionate (and very online) community when Lu first shared its abstract on Twitter. Some developers were angry that the university had intentionally wasted the maintainers’ time — which is a key difference between Minnesota’s work and a white-hat hacker poking around the Starbucks app for a bug bounty. “The researchers crossed a line they shouldn’t have crossed,” Scott says. “Nobody hired this group. They just chose to do it. And a whole lot of people spent a whole lot of time evaluating their patches.”

“If I were a volunteer putting my personal time into commits and testing, and then I found out someone’s experimenting, I would be unhappy,” Scott adds. 

Then, there’s the dicier issue of whether an experiment like this amounts to human experimentation. It doesn’t, according to the University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board. Lu and Wu applied for approval in response to the outcry, and they were granted a formal letter of exemption.

The community members I spoke to didn’t buy it. “The researchers attempted to get retroactive Institutional Review Board approval on their actions that were, at best, wildly ignorant of the tenants of basic human subjects’ protections, which are typically taught by senior year of undergraduate institutions,” says White. 

“It is generally not considered a nice thing to try to do ‘research’ on people who do not know you are doing research,” says Kroah-Hartman. “No one asked us if it was acceptable.” 

“That paper, it’s just a lot of crap.”

That thread ran through many of the responses I got from developers — that regardless of the harms or benefits that resulted from its research, the university was messing around not just with community members but with the community’s underlying philosophy. Anyone who uses an operating system places some degree of trust in the people who contribute to and maintain that system. That’s especially true for people who use open-source software, and it’s a principle that some Linux users take very seriously. 

“By definition, open source depends on a lively community,” Scott says. “There have to be people in that community to submit stuff, people in the community to document stuff, and people to use it and to set up this whole feedback loop to constantly make it stronger. That loop depends on lots of people, and you have to have a level of trust in that system ... If somebody violates that trust, that messes things up.” 

After the paper’s release, it was clear to many Linux kernel developers that something needed to be done about the University of Minnesota — previous submissions from the university needed to be reviewed. “Many of us put an item on our to-do list that said, ‘Go and audit all submissions,’” said Kroah-Hartman, who was, above all else, annoyed that the experiment had put another task on his plate. But many kernel maintainers are volunteers with day jobs, and a large-scale review process didn’t materialize. At least, not in 2020. 

On April 6th, 2021, Aditya Pakki, using his own email address, submitted a patch. 

There was some brief discussion from other developers on the email chain, which fizzled out within a few days. Then Kroah-Hartman took a look. He was already on high alert for bad code from the University of Minnesota, and Pakki’s email address set off alarm bells. What’s more, the patch Pakki submitted didn’t appear helpful. “It takes a lot of effort to create a change that looks correct, yet does something wrong,” Kroah-Hartman told me. “These submissions all fit that pattern.”

So on April 20th, Kroah-Hartman put his foot down. 

“Please stop submitting known-invalid patches,” he wrote to Pakki. “Your professor is playing around with the review process in order to achieve a paper in some strange and bizarre way.” 

Maintainer Leon Romanovsky then chimed in: he’d taken a look at four previously accepted patches from Pakki and found that three of them added “various severity” security vulnerabilities. 

There’s the dicier issue of whether an experiment like this amounts to human experimentation

Kroah-Hartman hoped that his request would be the end of the affair. But then Pakki lashed back. “I respectfully ask you to cease and desist from making wild accusations that are bordering on slander,” he wrote to Kroah-Hartman in what appears to be a private message. 

Kroah-Hartman responded. “You and your group have publicly admitted to sending known-buggy patches to see how the kernel community would react to them, and published a paper based on that work. Now you submit a series of obviously-incorrect patches again, so what am I supposed to think of such a thing?” he wrote back on the morning of April 21st. 

Later that day, Kroah-Hartman made it official. “Future submissions from anyone with a address should be default-rejected unless otherwise determined to actually be a valid fix,” he wrote in an email to a number of maintainers, as well as Lu, Pakki, and Wu. Kroah-Hartman reverted 190 submissions from Minnesota affiliates — 68 couldn’t be reverted but still needed manual review.

It’s not clear what experiment the new patch was part of, and Pakki declined to comment for this story. Lu’s website includes a brief reference to “superfluous patches from Aditya Pakki for a new bug-finding project.”

What is clear is that Pakki’s antics have finally set the delayed review process in motion; Linux developers began digging through all patches that university affiliates had submitted in the past. Jonathan Corbet, the founder and editor in chief of, recently provided an update on that review process. Per his assessment, “Most of the suspect patches have turned out to be acceptable, if not great.” Of over 200 patches that were flagged, 42 are still set to be removed from the kernel.

Regardless of whether their reaction was justified, the Linux community gets to decide if the University of Minnesota affiliates can contribute to the kernel again. And that community has made its demands clear: the school needs to convince them its future patches won’t be a waste of anyone’s time. 

What will it take to do that? In a statement released the same day as the ban, the university’s computer science department suspended its research into Linux-kernel security and announced that it would investigate Lu’s and Wu’s research method.

But that wasn’t enough for the Linux Foundation. Mike Dolan, Linux Foundation SVP and GM of projects, wrote a letter to the university on April 23rd, which The Verge has viewed. Dolan made four demands. He asked that the school release “all information necessary to identify all proposals of known-vulnerable code from any U of MN experiment” to help with the audit process. He asked that the paper on hypocrite commits be withdrawn from publication. He asked that the school ensure future experiments undergo IRB review before they begin, and that future IRB reviews ensure the subjects of experiments provide consent, “per usual research norms and laws.”

The school needs to convince them its future patches won’t be a waste of anyone’s time

Two of those demands have since been met. Wu and Lu have retracted the paper and have released all the details of their study.

The university’s status on the third and fourth counts is unclear. In a letter sent to the Linux Foundation on April 27th, Heimdahl and Loren Terveen (the computer science and engineering department's associate department head) maintain that the university’s IRB “acted properly,” and argues that human-subjects research “has a precise technical definition according to US federal regulations ... and this technical definition may not accord with intuitive understanding of concepts like ‘experiments’ or even ‘experiments on people.’” They do, however, commit to providing more ethics training for department faculty. Reached for comment, university spokesperson Dan Gilchrist referred me to the computer science and engineering department’s website.

Meanwhile, Lu, Wu, and Pakki apologized to the Linux community this past Saturday in an open letter to the kernel mailing list, which contained some apology and some defense. “We made a mistake by not finding a way to consult with the community and obtain permission before running this study; we did that because we knew we could not ask the maintainers of Linux for permission, or they would be on the lookout for hypocrite patches,” the researchers wrote, before going on to reiterate that they hadn’t put any vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel, and that their other patches weren’t related to the hypocrite commits research.

Kroah-Hartman wasn’t having it. “The Linux Foundation and the Linux Foundation’s Technical Advisory Board submitted a letter on Friday to your university,” he responded. “Until those actions are taken, we do not have anything further to discuss.”

Coronavirus in Minnesota
Photo by Glen Stubbe / Star Tribune via Getty Images

From the University of Minnesota researchers’ perspective, they didn’t set out to troll anyone — they were trying to point out a problem with the kernel maintainers’ review process. Now the Linux community has to reckon with the fallout of their experiment and what it means about the security of open-source software.

Some developers rejected University of Minnesota researchers’ perspective outright, claiming the fact that it’s possible to fool maintainers should be obvious to anyone familiar with open-source software. “If a sufficiently motivated, unscrupulous person can put themselves into a trusted position of updating critical software, there’s honestly little that can be done to stop them,” says White, the security researcher. 

On the other hand, it’s clearly important to be vigilant about potential vulnerabilities in any operating system. And for others in the Linux community, as much ire as the experiment drew, its point about hypocrite commits appears to have been somewhat well taken. The incident has ignited conversations about patch-acceptance policies and how maintainers should handle submissions from new contributors, across Twitter, email lists, and forums. “Demonstrating this kind of ‘attack’ has been long overdue, and kicked off a very important discussion,” wrote maintainer Christoph Hellwig in an email thread with other maintainers. “I think they deserve a medal of honor.”

“This research was clearly unethical, but it did make it plain that the OSS development model is vulnerable to bad-faith commits,” one user wrote in a discussion post. “It now seems likely that Linux has some devastating back doors.”

Corbet also called for more scrutiny around new changes in his post about the incident. “If we cannot institutionalize a more careful process, we will continue to see a lot of bugs, and it will not really matter whether they were inserted intentionally or not,” he wrote.

“This method works.”

And even for some of the paper’s most ardent critics, the process did prove a point — albeit, perhaps, the opposite of the one Wu, Lu, and Pakki were trying to make. It demonstrated that the system worked.

Eric Mintz, who manages 25 Linux servers, says this ban has made him much more confident in the operating system’s security. “I have more trust in the process because this was caught,” he says. “There may be compromises we don’t know about. But because we caught this one, it’s less likely we don’t know about the other ones. Because we have something in place to catch it.”

To Scott, the fact that the researchers were caught and banned is an example of Linux’s system functioning exactly the way it’s supposed to. “This method worked,” he insists. “The SolarWinds method, where there’s a big corporation behind it, that system didn’t work. This system did work.” 

“Kernel developers are happy to see new tools created and — if the tools give good results — use them. They will also help with the testing of these tools, but they are less pleased to be recipients of tool-inspired patches that lack proper review,” Corbet writes. The community seems to be open to the University of Minnesota’s feedback — but as the Foundation has made clear, it’s on the school to make amends.

“The university could repair that trust by sincerely apologizing, and not fake apologizing, and by maybe sending a lot of beer to the right people,” Scott says. “It’s gonna take some work to restore their trust. So hopefully they’re up to it.”